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Introduction
“Democratisation” movements have risen and fallen all over the world over the
past two decades, and the debate regarding the “incompatibility” between democracy and
“Asian values” rages on. Do Asian political systems fall short of securing freedoms—
substantive freedoms—for their citizens? Then again, even in the category of “Asian”
countries, there exists a diverse range of political systems across the region. Amartya Sen
in Development as Freedom questions why Asian countries prioritize economic needs
over securing political liberties, saying that these interests clash1. At the nexus of this
tension is Singapore. Similarly, Fukuyama described Singapore as “ha[ving] a rule of law
in addition to a state but very limited democracy.”2 He says this as if it is a bad thing.
How much is having—or lacking—democracy really an important factor in considering
the success of a government in developing a country/society?
What is really meant by “democracy” and what is the point of a government?
How should we measure the “success” of a society? What truly lies at the core of this
“East vs West” debate? Through an engagement with Amartya Sen’s work, this paper
hopes to illuminate several threads of fundamental arguments to better understand these
questions. By rethinking the process of individual identity formation, this paper
challenges the fundamental individualistic assumptions of Sen’s framework, specifically
with regard to his claim that democratic political freedoms are necessarily precedent to
other freedoms.
My motivation for investigating this topic comes from a personal interest. I’ve
been reflecting on the juxtaposition of my experiences growing up in Asia but also
having extensive exposure to Western philosophy and the championing of “liberal
democracy.” I’m interested in the questions above because I think discussions about the

1

Sen Amartya. Development as Freedom. Anchor Books, 1999., pg 147
Fukuyama, Francis. Political Order and Political Decay: from the Industrial Revolution to the
Globalization of Democracy. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014., pg 25
2
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government systems have deep assumptions that cut along cultural lines. There is also a
current focus on the “differences” between East and West, which does not bridge the
conversation or provide ideas for common ground.

5

Chapter 1: What are the goals we are working toward?
DEVELOPMENT & FREEDOM — WHY THEY MATTER
What does “development” in society mean? Amartya Sen proposes defining
“development” as “a process of expanding the real/substantive freedoms that people
enjoy [in a society].”3 Sen claims that “substantive freedoms” is the only true information
base that fully captures the standard of living in a society. Sen explains that he refers to
the conditions and opportunities one has for “good living”. But Sen’s “perspective on
freedom” is rather vague; he does not provide a framework to explain what is
encapsulated as these “substantive freedoms”. As such, this paper will refer to Martha
Nussbaum’s 10 Universal Capabilities as the list of “substantive freedoms”.

Martha Nussbaum identified an Aristotelian set of ten universal, normative
capabilities that act as “freedoms” that are generally protected by law. These may be
viewed as needs, although they are also related to values. Here is the list of “Central
Human Capabilities”4:

1. Life: Being able to live a complete and satisfying life into old age. Not having life
cut short or being made such that it hardly seems worth living.
2. Bodily Health: Living with good health, and not in a state where ill health
seriously affects the quality of life. Having access to medical help as needed. To
have good food and be able to exercise in ways that sustain health.
3. Bodily Integrity: Being able to go where you want to go. Being free from attack
and abuse of any kind. Being able to satisfy healthy bodily needs.
4. Senses, Imagination and Thought: Being able to use all of one's senses. Being free
to imagine, think and reason. Having the education that enables this to be done in
a civilized, human way. Having access to cultural experiences, literature, art and
so on and being able to produce one's own expressive work. Having freedom of
expression, including political and religious.

3

Sen, pg 17
Nussbaum, Martha. “CAPABILITIES AS FUNDAMENTAL ENTITLEMENTS: SEN AND SOCIAL
JUSTICE.” Feminist Economics, vol. 9, no. 2-3, 2003, pp. 33–59., doi:10.1080/1354570022000077926. ,
pg 41-42
4
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5. Emotion: Being able to become attached to other things and people outside of
ourselves, loving and caring for them. Experiencing grief, longing, gratitude and
justified anger. Not being subject to fear and anxiety or blighted by trauma or
neglect.
6. Practical Reason: Being able to consider and develop understanding of good and
evil, and to think critically about the world and one's own place in it. Being able
to live with one's conscience.
7. Affiliation: Being able to associate with others, living with them and acting for
them. Showing concern for people in general and interacting with others. Having
sympathy and compassion, acting to help people. Seeking justice and making
things right. Protecting others and the rights of people, including freedom of
speech and freedom from fear.
8. Other Species: Being able to live with the full range of creatures and plants that
inhabit the world around us. To be able to enjoy nature and appreciate its beauty.
9. Play: Being able to laugh, play games and generally have fun. Not having one’s
enjoyment and recreation criticized or prevented.
10. Control Over One’s Environment: (A) Political: Being able to participate
effectively in political choices that govern one’s life; having the right of political
participation, protections of free speech and association. (B) Material: Being able
to hold property (both land and movable goods), and having property rights on an
equal basis with others; having the right to seek employment on an equal basis
with others; having the freedom from unwarranted search and seizure. In work,
being able to work as a human being, exercising practical reason, and entering
into meaningful relationships of mutual recognition with other workers.
A person’s ability to exercise these substantive freedoms are represented by their
“capabilities set”. Sen defines capabilities set as “the substantive freedoms to achieve the
alternative combinations of functionings that are feasible for one to choose a life one has
reason to value.”5 This “capabilities” approach has two evaluative elements that focus on
providing two pieces of information: first, an individual’s “realized functioning” (what a
person is actually able to do and tells us the things a person does) and second, their
“capability set of alternatives” (one’s real opportunities, which tells us the things a person
is substantively free to do). In less formal terms, it is the set of various lifestyles (that

5

Sen, pg 74
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substantively meet a decent threshold of these universal capabilities) someone can
actually pursue.
According to Sen, his “capabilities set” model is the only solid informational base
that can serve as a metric or standard for evaluative judgements, because all other models
are all lacking.

The utilitarian approach does not clearly account for the actual distributions of
resources and “utility” (whether it be mental satisfaction, pleasure or happiness).
Although this approach “has the advantage of not requiring that we understand the
difficult exercise of comparing different persons’ mental conditions”6, Sen explains that it
closes the discussion entirely of the possibility of direct interpersonal comparisons of
utilities7. Moreover, it also fails to incorporate non-utility concerns (like rights and the
substantive freedoms we have established as desirable for a society).
Relatedly, “economic welfare” is a poor measure, as looking at material wealth
doesn’t provide a holistic view about the social infrastructures in a society. Sen frames
“real income” as a form of utility comparison (a “commodity basis” of utility)8. It is
difficult to compare real-income basis since different people have diverse demand
functions, and more fundamentally, different needs. Aside from different “preferences”
of commodity bundles, people have different family structures (and thus varying
dynamics) with different personal conditions among family members (for example, some
members may have underlying health conditions that require a lot of medical treatment,
etc). Sen explicates all these heterogeneities of “well-being” as the following:

6

Sen, pg 68
Ibid
8
Sen, pg 69
7
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1. Personal heterogeneities: physical disabilities, illnesses, age, gender, implies a
huge diversity of needs
2. Environmental diversities: climate circumstances, prevalence of infectious
diseases, seasonal requirements all alter the quality of life that inhabitants of
particular areas enjoy
3. Variations in social climate: elements like public educational arrangements,
levels of crime and violence in the particular location, all influence the conversion
of income into quality of life
4. Differences in relational perspectives: depending on the conventions and customs
of a community, the requirements of established patterns of behaviour may vary.
This point is related to a sense of the ability to “appear in public without shame”
and a sense of basic self-respect
5. Distribution within the family: intrafamily distribution of incomes is crucial in
understanding individual achievement and opportunities9
So merely looking at income levels does not provide substantive information
regarding how well people are faring in society.
The Nozick libertarian framework calls for the “complete prioritisation” of liberty
as the main evaluation standard. This uncompromising priority of libertarian rights can be
particularly problematic. Claiming an absolute priority of liberty might come at the cost
of other substantive freedoms, like avoiding premature mortality, maintaining a wellnourished and healthy life, being able to educate and grow oneself, etc10. However, Sen
alludes to an approval of a Rawlsian libertarian view, that places a comparative
prioritisation of liberty. We’ll read more on this below.

Sen says that the process of development in society has to be done in terms of
whether these substantive freedoms have been enhanced. His view of freedom (and thus
development) encompasses both the processes that allow for actions and decisions (which
he calls its ‘instrumental’ role), and the actual opportunities that people have11 (which he
calls its ‘constitutive’ role). Sen uses the terms “freedom” and “development” almost
9

Sen, pg 70-71
Sen, pg 66
11
Sen pg 17
10
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interchangeably but I will be using the term “development” to talk about this end-goal of
a society and “freedom” to refer to the “substantive freedoms” listed above.

Additionally, Sen says that the achievement of development is thoroughly
dependent on the free agency of individuals. Sen places a strong emphasis on individual
freedoms, reasoning that: first, having greater freedom to do the things one has reason to
value is 1. Significant in itself for the person’s overall freedom, and 2. Important in
fostering the person’s opportunity to have valuable outcomes; secondly, greater freedom
enhances the ability of people to help themselves, and also to influence the world, matters
which are central to the process of development. Sen says that this “freedom-based
perspective” takes note of the utilitarianism’s interest in human well-being, libertarian’s
involvement with the processes of choice and the freedom to act, the Rawlsian theory’s
focus on individual liberty. But it also takes into account the resources needed for
substantive freedoms12. This model thus becomes a key foundation for his further
elaboration of his framework.
“DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL FREEDOMS”
Sen seems to argue that there are some substantive freedoms that should be the
measure of how good a social arrangement (aka a society’s development) is. Among
them, he points to five forms of ‘instrumental’ freedoms that are absolutely necessary to
achieving development: political freedoms (opportunities that people have to determine
who should govern, and on what principles); economic facilities (opportunities that
individuals respectively enjoy to utilise economic resources for the purpose of
consumption, production or exchange); social opportunities (arrangements that society
makes for education, healthcare, influences that make individuals’ substantive freedom to
live better); transparency guarantees (the freedom to deal with one another under
guarantees of disclosure and lucidity); and protective securities (fixed institutional

12

Sen, pg 86
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arrangements and ad hoc arrangements that prevent individuals from falling into a state
of unfreedoms, like poverty)13.

But once again, Sen does not explicitly provide an exhaustive list of the elements
constituted within the pool of “political freedoms”. So let’s expand a little bit on what I
think he is trying to get at. Based on his writings, it seems that a few key elements of
Sen’s political freedoms include: Representative government (or direct democracy),
participation in protests and freedom of speech and expression. 14

He emphasizes that different kinds of freedoms interrelate with one another, but
“political and liberal rights” should take precedence over the others. In the selection of
weights,[...] no such magic formula exists, since the issue of weighing is one of valuation
and judgment and not one of some impersonal technology15. Sen does not make an
explicit linkage here but he seems to be talking about political freedoms as what
democracy embodies and uses the terms interchangeably. According to Sen, political
freedoms have three distinct roles: firstly, it has a direct (intrinsic) importance/relevance,
in human living associated with basic capabilities (including that of political and social
participation). Secondly, it has a constructive role in the conceptualisation of needs. The
exercise of basic political rights makes it more likely that not only will there be a policy
response to economic needs, but also that the conceptualisation (including
comprehension) of “economic needs” itself may require the exercise of such rights.
Lastly, political freedoms have an instrumental role in that they enhance the chance that
people will get heard when expressing their claims regarding political matters. Informed
and unregimented formation of our values requires openness of communication and
arguments, and political freedoms and civil rights can be central to this process.16
Herein lies a distinction between Sen and Nussbaum’s stance regarding what Sen
13

Sen, pg 38-39
Sen, pg 38-39
15
Sen, pg 97
16
Sen, pg 152
14
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calls “democratic political freedoms”. And it is precisely this element of his framework
that I will be contending with in this paper.
TEASING OUT SEN’S ARGUMENTS
I will be focusing on the constructive and instrumental claims because they are
center to understanding Sen’s conception of his framework. The foundations of his
argument, which will be fleshed out below are what I will refer to as Sen’s “individualist
assumption.”
On the point of the “constructive role”, Sen claims that individual political
freedoms are necessary for achieving social agreement about value. To have a
functioning society, we first need to know what the society values. Sen argues that the
only way to do this is via political freedoms. Sen’s assumption is that individuals in a
society have heterogeneous preferences, and so we need a way to aggregate everything.
The way to do this is to have individuals express their preferences via platforms like free
speech and unbiased media. Sen’s individual political freedoms are the only way to make
sense & order the values and decisions and structure and functioning of society. He ties
this back to his model of capabilities set mentioned earlier. The capabilities perspective is
inescapably pluralist, and rightfully so because interpersonal comparisons of overall
advantages require an aggregation over heterogeneous components17. Political freedom
provides the opportunity for citizens to discuss and debate—to participate in the selection
of—values in the choice of priorities18. This explains why, to Sen, political freedoms are
the most important element to have in a society aka the first substantive freedom.

Sen further says that individual political freedoms are necessary for achieving
substantive freedoms. For this instrumental claim, Sen seems to be saying that securing
basic political liberties secures the causal conditions necessary for developing the other
freedoms. Even if we had the communication about ordering these values, we still need to

17
18

Sen, pg 30
Ibid
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take this further step to guarantee that this information is executed and delivered into
society. Sen seems to be implicitly asking questions of political authority, accountability
and transparency. We need a guarantee that these preferences are actually what shapes
the social order. A crucial implied assumption here is that those in positions of
leadership/authority may not be aligned with the values and wishes of the masses.
Suppose there was a really nice supreme dictator who somehow, very efficiently,
conducted regular mass surveys to keep up with everyone’s capability sets and their
preferences (broadly defined). Why would this not be an insufficient model of
government? Is the dictator not agglomerating the preferences of his people and keeping
up with their interests? Sen thinks that another key element of individual political
freedom is the procedural definition of democratic choice, in the form of elections19. To
express publicly what one values and to demand that attention be paid to it, people in
society need free speech and democratic choice20. Only this way will rulers have the
incentive to listen to what people want, since they would have to face the people’s
criticism for any missteps.

Now, let us move onto illuminating how Sen has a mistaken understanding of
individual identity formation that deconstructs a fundamental assumption of his
framework.

19
20

Sen, pg 152
Ibid
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Chapter 2: What are some assumptions we’ve overlooked?
So far that we’ve seen from the previous chapter that Sen’s account is relatively
persuasive. But there’s one key issue with his argument: the entirety of Sen’s framework
hinges on the assumption that individuals naturally have different preferences, that must
then be aggregated together in society. The individual is assumed to have interests and
preferences, defined independently of, and prior to joining any group. The process of
aggregation and ordering enabled through political freedoms will then form society’s
identity. And this sense of societal identity will then be used as the basis of determining
the policies of running the society. But this is flawed for two reasons.

THE FORMATION OF INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY
First, individual identity presupposes community identity. To understand why this
is so, let us take a look at Elizabeth Anderson’s paper “Unstrapping the Straitjacket of
‘Preference”. Although the topic of Anderson’s paper is not directly related to Sen’s
arguments in “Development as Freedom”, the work of Sen that Anderson builds off
supports my argument as it deconstructs the concept of the “individual,” and serves as the
framework of rebutting him. In an earlier paper (“Behaviour and the Concept of
Preference” (1973)), Sen reframed the understanding of the concept of individual
preferences into an instrumental one in determining behavior rather than as the end goals
to be fulfilled by individual behavior, welfare, and rationality. The idea of preference has
been misused by economists to perform three distinct tasks: a) describe a person’s
choices; b) represent whatever motives underlie a person’s choices; and c) to represent a
person’s welfare.21 To “instrumentalise” the concept of individual preferences is to think
about it in terms of the distinction between agency (in choosing whatever state of affairs
one values) and welfare (the narrow sense of self-interest and welfare). 22 The latter
relates to why it is important (according to Sen) to enable individuals to take into

21

Anderson, Elizabeth. “Symposium on Amartya Sen's Philosophy: 2 Unstrapping the Straitjacket of
‘Preference’: a Comment on Amartya Sen's Contributions to Philosophy and Economics.” Economics and
Philosophy, vol. 17, no. 1, 2001, pp. 21–38., doi:10.1017/s0266267101000128., pg 22
22
Ibid
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consideration their preferences in society. In Sen’s world, this is represented by his
capabilities set and functionings. Anderson concurs with all to this point.

But then we get to the question of judgements on rationality, and this is the key
part to understanding why Sen’s framework discussed above is lacking and somewhat
mistaken. Consider the classic game theory prisoner’s dilemma situation. Bearing in
mind that social arrangements can be framed as iterated prisoner’s dilemma situations,
and given the current work/findings of economics and rational decision theory, the
dominant choice for each player is to defect. However, even though the desirable
outcome is for players to cooperate, this is not seen as rational. How then can we
reconcile the “rationality” of committed actions with individual preferences?

Sen introduces a concept of commitment that is not framed in terms of
preferences at all. His discussion of the prisoner’s dilemma situations suggests that
individuals who always act on their preferences are either fools or social misfits in
circumstances where acting on social norms of cooperation brings about better
consequences for all. A key concern that then follows is how can it be “rational” for the
individual to act on socially and ethically desirable principles when doing so does not
advance the satisfaction of her broad or narrow individual preferences. This is also a
concern in the chapter we explored above: Assuming that political freedoms can help
order the values of individuals in a society, as Sen argues, but how do we get them to
actually act on the outcomes of these compromises?

However, Anderson argues that we need more robust conceptions of collective
agency and individual identity. Returning to the examples of cooperative solutions Sen
proposed in prisoner’s dilemma scenarios, we need to then figure out how to reconcile
this account with the ideas of rational principle that values preference-satisfaction. One
way is to just assume that people have altruistic preferences, or alternatively, that the act
of cooperation is valued intrinsically23. But Anderson quickly proves why both theories
23

Anderson, pg 25
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do not hold by showing how once these accounts don’t construct a prisoner’s dilemma
situation, which should be defined as a situation where people accept a principle of
rational choice that has an act-consequentialist form24.

So how then can we reconcile cooperation as a socially desirable trait and a
rational action?

Anderson tries to pull together (from various pieces of his work), a prediction of
what Sen would have said about this matter, and now we return to the question of
identities. An argument in the spirit of Sen’s POV would look something like this:
Individual identities may be constituted by membership in various social groups. Since
people act in accordance with what they understand is their identities. The solution to
one-shot prisoner dilemmas would then be for parties to reach a collectively desirable
action by treating the unit of selection as their joint strategy. Anderson writes that any
group “whose members refer to one another as ‘we’ [would thus] see themselves as ready
to be jointly committed to acting together.”25 By regarding themselves as “members of a
single collective agent,”26 Anderson reasons that “whatever can count as a reason for
action for one member of the collective must count as a reason for all.”27 Having taken up
this perspective of “collective agency,” each individual party has rational justification for
viewing “their actions as jointly advancing a desirable goal.”28 Additionally, the only
reasons for action that each individual would be willing to accept are the considerations
that they can reason every other person would also be willing to accept.29 Anderson
claims that this “practical identification” actually does not require any prior acquaintance
or relationship, only that the collective in question sees themselves as “solving a problem
by joining forces.”30
24

Anderson, pg 26
Anderson, pg 28
26
Anderson, pg 29
27
Ibid
28
Anderson, pg 30
29
Anderson, pg 29
30
Anderson, pg 31
25
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In reality, parties would need to consider various policies of mixed and
conditional cooperation. But what remains problematic with this priority of identity to
rational principle boils down to the concept of identity. Anderson’s proposal is that, if a
person identifies with a group in such a way that the group counts as a collective agent,
then it is rational for that person to act on the principles of that group. But we have not
yet resolved the question of why it might be rational to identify with a group.
Using Sen’s own case study on material gender inequality and cooperative
conflict in the family, Anderson shows how reframing the concept of identity formation.
Using Sen’s own work on gender and the division of family resources, she illustrates how
the freedom to determine one’s own priorities in committing oneself to various groups
depends on those groups limiting their demands on members in ways that enable their
members to identify with and function as members of multiple groups. Sometimes you
can find yourself in different groups that make incompatible demands on you.31 Thus, the
individual would need to be able to harmonise these different demands by adopting a
perspective that can coordinate them well. Women can only achieve a true sense of
“individual identity” by having mobility between different types of collective agencies—
the freedom to move from the family sphere to other spheres of social organisations,
outside of employment, politics, women’s associations, etc.32
Anderson’s framework ties in with Margaret Somers’ theory of identity formation
through a “conceptual narrative” process. As one interacts with different community
groups, they explore different ideas, experience different ways of life and eventually
discover for themselves what they individually have reason to value33. “People construct
identities (however multiple and changing) by locating themselves or being located
within a repertoire of emplotted stories [...] people make sense of what has happened and

31

Anderson, pg 36
Ibid
33
Thanks to Benjamin McAnally for discussing this idea with me.
32
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is happening to them by attempting to assemble or in some way to integrate these
happenings within one or more narratives.”34 These experiences inevitably include one’s
interactions with other members of society. Thus, “the others [in society]” are constitutive
rather than external to a sense of self, individual identity and agency35.
We can use this line of argumentation to deconstruct Sen’s arguments presented
in the earlier chapter. Rather than individual preferences being aggregated into the
community’s values, the only sort of “individuality” that everyone in a society can be is
one who identifies with multiple collective agencies and therefore accepts multiple social
commitments. Individuals need to be able to have mobility across different types of
collective agencies in order to figure out what values they want to take on themselves.
The act of committing oneself to various groups enables the freedom to determine one’s
own priorities, and consequently, the formation of individual identity.

The only sort of individual that everyone can be is one who identifies with
multiple collective agencies, and who therefore accepts multiple commitments, not
grounded in individual preferences, as reasons for action. This speaks to the importance
of community in identity formation.
DISTINGUISHING “ASSOCIATION” VS “MOBILITY”
Consider for a moment a potential counterpoint: Sen could argue that you cannot
be able to have this opportunity of exploring different community groups without the
political right of freedom of association.

My counterclaim to this argument is to delineate the freedom of association as
being more foundational than being part of the bundle of Sen’s “political freedoms.”
Perhaps a more apt phrasing of this “freedom” is the freedom of “mobility between
groups,” since freedom of association is conventionally thought of in terms of political
34

Somers, Margaret R. “The Narrative Constitution of Identity: A Relational and Network Approach.”
Theory and Society, vol. 23, no. 5, 1994, pp. 605–649., doi:10.1007/bf00992905., pg 614
35
Ibid
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association. Mobility between groups is a freedom that is necessary for exploring
different “communal narrative experiences” as described in the above section. We can
construe the value of “freedom of association” as having the “ordering” function in
democratic political freedoms. “Mobility” deals with a construction of the narrative self
while “association” usually implies the capabilities to also organise and to form and
participate in groups that lead to some sort of action.

Further, a possible Anderson rejoinder to Sen would be that we cannot justify the
value of [freedom of association] by appealing to its utility for agglomerating individual
preferences, if we cannot get individual preferences without the freedom of association.
Sen’s counter would be a circular one. Part of Anderson’s account does include the need
to have some guarantees (that may be provided by individual political freedoms) so that
we substantially have mobility between different groups in society and defend ourselves.
However, this argument plays out differently for Sen because his motivation of placing
preeminent importance on the freedom of association individual political freedoms is to
enable the process of agglomerating preferences.
Sen’s individualist assumption for the instrumental value of political freedoms
presupposes that individual preferences do not depend on prior membership in group
agents. However, Anderson’s argument shows how there is more to be said about the
formation of identities than Sen considered. Her “narrative” approach to identity
formation shows that, to figure out how one comes to form their own identity, one must
engage in intersubjective narrative practices of different communities. The role of the
agent is not an a priori cartesian agent, and instead, the individual is constituted by and
constituted of a whole. The exploration of Anderson’s work shows how Sen’s
overemphasis on his individualist assumption weakens his claims about the preeminence
of individual political freedoms.
Anderson’s account is essentially making a case of how people eventually
develop as individuals, and I don’t have any qualms about that argument at all. But to

19

push further in this direction, let us entertain the possibility of whether we should even be
thinking about individuality in the first place.
THE “INDIVIDUAL” AS AN ECONOMIC, IDEOLOGICAL CONSTRUCT
The second reason why Sen’s individualist assumption does not hold as strongly
as he takes as given, is because there is reason to think that the notion of the “individual”
is not an a priori in societies. Perhaps it is worth raising some skepticism over the
placement of the “individual” at the foundation of an argument that pertains to the nature
of the classic democratic political liberties, since these liberties can be appealed to in an
ideological fashion. Let us turn to Karl Marx and his essay “On the Jewish Question” to
explore the thought that a sense of “the individualistic man” can be framed as an ideology
that prevents one from actually being “free”.
In Marx’s work, he uses the word “emancipation” instead of “liberation” or
“freedom” largely because, under his school of thought, the general population of
humanity is divided between the oppressed and the oppressor. And thus when we talk
about the kind of freedom/liberation in society, Marx talks about it in terms of
emancipation. Marx defines “political emancipation” as the final form of human
emancipation within the framework of the prevailing social order36. It means the
condition where the state no longer dictates people’s decisions in specific domains; the
condition where one is free to do whatever one desires in a particular aspect of life.

But Marx argues that true emancipation is human emancipation; political
emancipation is not enough. “Human emancipation” is the state where no form of
oppression substantively exists in society. The state can liberate itself from some
arbitrary constraint without the people in society being really liberated; a state might be a
free state without man himself being a free man. The oppressive hierarchies, even when
not sanctioned by the state, can still be continuously perpetuated in society.

36

Marx, Karl. “On the Jewish Question.” The Marx-Engels Reader, by Robert C. Tucker et al., Norton,
1978, pp. 26–52. , pg 35
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Responding to the issue of Jewish emancipation in a Christian state, Marx
discusses the distinction between the rights of man and the rights of the citizen. He quotes
Rousseau on the notion of the political man, illustrating that man, in a political society
has his own powers taken from him and given “alien powers” which he can only employ
with the help of other men [in the political society]. He concludes that human
emancipation requires breaking the distinction made between man as an “egoistic being”
in civil society and man as an abstract citizen in the state.
Marx argues that political emancipation “is a reduction of man, on the one hand,
to a member of civil society, an independent and egoistic individual, and on the other
hand, to a citizen, a moral person.”37 Human emancipation would enable the individual to
recognise oneself as a “species-being” and not separate their social power from oneself as
a political power.38 In virtue of being part of a society, man is dependent on other men.
Here, Marx borrows the terms “egoistic being” and “species being” from Feuerbach’s
work on the nature of man. Feuerbach argues that human beings distinguish themselves
from animals by a particular kind of consciousness: not merely a consciousness of
himself as an individual, but the consciousness of himself as a member of the human
species.39 Marx employs this term to further his argument that since this “speciesconsciousness” defines the nature of man, man is only living and acting authentically
when he lives and acts deliberately as a “species-being” rather than an “egoistic being”.40
That is, human beings are fundamentally socially dependent and interconnected beings,
not as “individuals”.
Marx’s ideas provide an alternative view of emancipation that takes into account
the relationship between an individual and their relation to their society. Although he
does not particularly provide a positive argument of what this means for political
37
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societies, we can see how Marx’s chain of arguments ties back to Anderson’s above.
Developing a sense of “individual self” requires a recognition and internalisation of one’s
relationship with others in society. This is the highest form of “emancipation”, and the
only true holistic view of human beings who are a part of society. What Marx calls “the
consciousness of himself as a member of the human species” would be what is
considered a byproduct of the final stage in Anderson’s argument: A person, having had
experienced different membership in various communities, is now able to determine what
different values and ideas they want to take for themselves. And in doing so, the person
now has developed a sense of “individual” self that incorporates their membership and
thus relationship with these different communities in society.
But for the sake of continuing the conversation within Sen’s world, let us
entertain the understanding that a conception of “the individual” can exist without the
oppressive existential angst Marx introduces. I should also clarify one critical point: I am
not arguing against the conception and development of a sense of “individual self”. My
contention with Sen’s work is deprioritising the emphasis of the individual. I am arguing
that his understanding of the nature of interactions in society, particularly with regards to
how we should think about governance and the development of society, cannot be
centered solely on individuals as if they had a priori preferences.
Next we’ll take a look at an empirical example to consider if there are indeed
valid alternatives to Sen’s political freedoms that can act as a value-ordering procedure in
society that would still succeed in securing other substantive freedoms.
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Chapter 3: Are the values embodied by “democracy” truly universal?
Previously we explored how Sen’s individualist assumption isn’t as wellgrounded as he claimed. He also says that we absolutely need to first secure democratic
political freedoms as the only way to achieve the things provided by its instrumental and
constructive roles. But there are reasons to think that there exist alternative ways to
achieve these functions through non-legal mechanisms. Additionally, Sen also appeals to
this notion that “democracy is a universal value” and attempts to build on his previous
arguments by insisting that political freedoms are intrinsically valuable and thus ought to
be given importance by states regardless of their cultural background.
For the remainder of the paper, I will use the term “democracy” specifically as
Sen uses it to refer to his conceptions of democratic political freedoms.

THE CULTURAL CRITIQUE
Aside from Sen’s claim that democratic political freedoms are preeminent, he also
says that it is certainly not just a “luxury” that “poor countries cannot afford”. Among the
criticism he addresses in his advocacy of democracy as an integral, fundamental aspect of
society, he expounds greatly on the “cultural critique.” The cultural critique rejects Sen’s
claims of the superiority of democracy on the grounds that democracy is “specifically a
‘Western’ priority, which goes against, in particular, Asian values.”41 We would be trying
to fit a round peg into a square hole, so to speak. In chapter 10 of his book, Sen counters
the cultural critique by citing historical examples of cultural/thought leaders from various
Asian countries who advocate for “views of freedom, tolerance and equality.” Some
examples include Confucius from ancient China, Emperor Ashoka and Kautilya from
India, and the Moghul Emperor Akbar who practiced political and religious tolerance.42
In order to evaluate the validity of Sen’s defense, we need to unpack a few
elements that Sen failed to consider: the history of Western colonialism (which lead to a
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difference in geopolitical powers, and perhaps better illuminate the discrepancies in
Asian prioritisation of values) and the trans-temporal evolution of culture (which may
imply that his historical examples are outdated).
In the following sections, we will expound on first, how Sen’s response to the
cultural critique is lacking a holistic view of the factors determining whether Asians
value freedom. Secondly, even if we suppose that Sen did successfully establish that
Asian countries do hold freedom as valuable, his arguments are not convincing that
freedom should be treated as a foundational virtue, rather than as part of a cluster of core
values.

THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF ASIA
First and foremost, it is easy to overlook the colonial history of Asian countries.
These colonial legacies left behind institutions, practices, etc. that were not compatible
with the native cultures of those places. These colonial legacies have an impact on the
development of cultural thought as well as the social environment and systems of these
countries.

Many economists and social scientists believe that differences in institutions and
state policies are at the root of large differences in income per capita across countries. But
in their paper, Daron Acemoglu et al. argue that differences in colonial experience could
be a source of exogenous differences in institutions of different countries.43 In their study,
Acemoglu et al. focused on European colonisation and their different colonisation
strategies on different countries. For example, in countries like Australia, New Zealand
and the United States, European colonists settled in those areas and set up institutions that
enforced the rule of law and encouraged investments44. On the other extreme cases, like
Congo or the Gold Coast, the European settlers set up extractive states, which were
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intended to rapidly transfer resources to the metropole. These institutions did not
introduce much protection for private property, nor did they provide checks and balances
against government expropriation.45 Acemoglu et al. proposes that the differences in
these colonisation strategies were determined out of necessity depending on the local
conditions that were or were not conducive to European settlement. In places where the
environment (specifically, the disease environment of that country) was not favourable to
European settlement, which resulted in high mortality rates among the early settlers, it
was more likely that an extractive state was set up46. Very clearly from their findings, we
can see how the legacy of colonial experiences carry into the present.
So why is this legacy important to bear in mind? Developing a normative “ideal
theory” account of what institutions and infrastructures a country should have is
counterproductive—the fact is that there are very real contextual differences among these
countries. So we cannot simply “plug-and-chug” democracy institutionally like some
mathematical formula into other countries where their conditions are at a different
starting point.
Consider Thomas Nagel’s account of the relationship between democracy and
justice in his paper, “The Problem of Global Justice”:
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Figure 1: Nagel’s flowchart

Nagel believes that having a sovereign is a necessary prerequisite in the securing
of justice. Starting at the bottom, Nagel argues that in order to secure “justice” (of a
certain kind) presupposes “assurances” (that answer questions “of what?” and “to
whom?”), which in turn presupposes “laws” (regarding a certain set), which in turn
presupposes having a “sovereign” (of a certain kind)47. And then what this means is that a
state might end up being formed as, or transformed into a democracy, because the people
who want justice realize all of these presuppositions and therefore seek to establish a
democratic sovereign.
We can replace “justice” with Sen’s “development/freedom”. In Sen’s world, a
democratic government creates laws that provide assurances to secure individual
freedoms. In the pursuit of justice and freedom, eventually conceived of the democratic
system that we see today as they came to realize that democracy would be the system that
47
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would provide them with the best form of justice in their society. But it does not
guarantee that placing the topmost element (a democratic sovereign) in any society
automatically guarantees the top-down flow. A prevalent view in political science that
plugging a framework “at the top” will lead to a trickle down effect into society. But
bearing in mind the contextual differences among countries (due to colonial legacies and
the institutions that persisted), the way we should be thinking about this relationship
flowchart is to look at the thought process as a bottom-up flow as the formative process,
not a top-down flow.

But suppose Sen would rebut this point by denying that he is not urgently forcing
non-democracies to adopt a democratic system. He might say that countries are welcome
to address the immediate goals in their society, that may have been a result of their
colonial past, but eventually, it would do well for them to set up a democratic
government. Perhaps the broader consideration that Acemoglu et al.’s work points to is
that the types of institutions that can be established in a given country may be a matter of
geographic and material resources rather than values. Recalling that the reasons for what
kind of institution the European colonists established in different countries depended on
the material conditions of those colonised settlements that may or may not have been
conducive to early European settlers. Different countries thus might need different forms
of institutions to account for their geographical differences.

DIFFERENCE IN GEOPOLITICAL POWERS
Part of the legacy that colonised countries were left to deal with is from the
environmental resource aspect.48 British colonialists transformed the Malay peninsula
into a plantation economy to meet the needs of industrial Britain and America. This
included the expanding demand for cheap rubber during the industrial revolution.
Colonising countries were able to develop technologically much faster in part by raiding
resources from their colonies.
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The effects of this exploitation is felt even today. Taking another example of
Africa, a heavily colonised continent, we can see how little has changed with their
patterns of economic growth and trade.49 Africa’s economic growth is still largely driven
by primary commodities and natural resources, reflecting the persistence of the colonial
development model where natural resource-endowed nations served as feedstock to
advanced economies.50 Because manufactured goods with increasing technological
content account for much of global trade, the continued reliance on colonial-era
“extractivist” development models puts Africa at a disadvantage in the global economic
and trading environment.51 However, now it is not only a matter of accessibility to
natural resources, but also the availability of technological advancements.
Noting these stark historical differences in the countries’ development, we need to
recognize the differences in geopolitical powers between Western and Asian countries.
The difference in international status may require Asian countries to take different
measures in the establishment of their country’s political structure to account for this.
Countries may not necessarily agree with the values being touted but need to just follow
them because it’s the “rules of the game” they have to work around.

Political structures are not just a binary between democracy and authoritarianism.
Certainly, these are the two dominant political structures in the course of world history.
Sen claims that some political systems “have even championed harsher [systems]—with
denial of basic civil and political rights—for their alleged advantage in promoting
economic development”.52 By “some”, he means some Asian systems, specifically
pointing to Lee Kwan Yew’s infamous “Lee Thesis”, suggesting that certain Asian
leaders have inclined more towards authoritarianism than democratic. Looking at
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Southeast Asian countries in the post-Cold War era, we saw how the West advocated so
strongly for all these newly-independent countries to adopt democracy as their political
structure. Indonesia was one such example. Having been colonized by the Dutch for over
300 years, the nation declared its adoption a democratic government structure after
declaring independence, but only experienced the most growth—in all aspects—during
President Suharto’s “dictatorship.” Sen rejects the counter-argument that Asian countries
(or at least Southeast Asian countries) are “not ready” for democracy, instead
emphasizing that they will be ready through democracy. Perhaps we can turn to South
Korea as an example of a successful democratic Asian country. However, we can also
point to differences in South Korea’s “democracy” and the general idea of Western
democracies. For example, South Korea’s society is still marked by some extents of
national indoctrination, such as the emphasis on love and devotion to the nation, as well
as the integration of a “danil minjok” rhetoric (meaning “one people” Korean ethnic and
racial nationalism) into the education system.

Thus, we can see that, due to the combination of unique historical conditions of
Asian countries that inevitably places them at a different “development stage” than the
West, which requires a different political-social structure. Further, perhaps these
countries also value other “core virtues” in their societies aside from solely valuing
“freedom”. The case of South Korea being a successful example does not detract from
this claim because it only proves that there are inherent differences between Western and
Asian societies that would not allow the latter from entirely adopting the former’s model
of democracy.

THE TRANS-TEMPORAL EVOLUTION OF CULTURES
Sen’s use of historical examples does not apply to the present-day context. His
examples of Ashoka from third century B.C. and Moghul emperor Akbar from the 1550s
do not reflect Indian society’s general thought in 2021 (and even in the context of when
he was writing his book and articles in the 1990s). Sen himself has noted the fluidity of
society’s values and priorities, when he conceptualized the constructive role of
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democracy. Without getting too technical about every particular religion and tradition
that Sen expounded as examples, the general case is that modernization and progress
brings with it changes in society, with or without a democracy to facilitate the discussion.
Let us suppose, for argument’s sake, that we apply Sen’s claims in evaluating modernday “Asian” thought leaders. There is a critical problem in using a “part” to represent the
whole. Although Sen’s line of reasoning goes that: these particular individuals, who can
be said are thought leaders of a certain tradition or culture, exhibit traits that emphasize
freedom-oriented values. Since they are part of that respective culture, we can thus say
that there the culture also agrees with these freedom-oriented values. However,
contemporary violent tragedies in numerous social groups exemplify how it is wrong to
generalize beliefs and ideas of a leader as something that is applicable to the beliefs—and
consequently, the actions—of the public. Take the case of the stark contrast between
Pope Francis’ speeches and the numerous Catholic Church sex abuse scandals. Just
earlier in February this year, five major leaders were removed from position on charges
of sexual abuse.

Additionally, sometimes thought leaders can themselves be a wrongful litmus test
for public sentiment, as their words and the values they promote are not promoted
through their own actions. A prime example is Indonesian Islamic scholar and politician
Ma'ruf Amin, who is currently the chairman of the Majelis Ulema Indonesia. In Sunni
Islam, the ulema are the guardians, transmitters and interpreters of religious knowledge,
of Islamic doctrine and law. As the chairman of the Indonesian Ulema Council, Ma’ruf
Amin holds one of the highest positions, and supposedly one of the most respected
figures in the Islamic world. Since becoming the chosen running mate of the incumbent
Indonesian president for the upcoming elections in April 2019, he has espoused messages
promoting tolerance and acceptance. However, he has also issued several fatwas (a ruling
on the grounds of Islamic law given by a recognized authority) that exhibit anti-human
rights sentiments, particularly targeting the LGBT community in Indonesia. This case
further emphasizes how terribly misleading it is to use the ideas said by these leaders as a
reflection of the actual current state of a society’s beliefs or practices.
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Perceptions of norms and attitudes of rights or other moral values may evolve
over time. However, it is also worth noting the distinctive difference of these norms and
values with the core identity of certain cultures. The examples Sen presented are not
directly pointing to a similarity between Asian and Western values in their society’s core
identity.

REFRAMING SEN’S TRIANGLE OF “FREEDOM”
For this section of our discussion, I will be using the term “value” as a verb, and
use the term “virtue” as a noun, so as to avoid confusion when constructing sentences.
Sen’s “burden of proof” in disproving the cultural critique lies in his claim that
“[T]he real issue is not whether these non-freedom perspectives are present in Asian
traditions, but whether the freedom-oriented perspectives are absent there.”53 In other
words, Sen seems to be saying that it needs to be shown that those societies don’t value
freedom. It is not enough to show that they value other things, possibly as much as he
values freedom. Yet freedom is in fact so important to all achieving all these other
capabilities. So surely freedom must be at the core of a society’s virtues? To visually
illustrate this, perhaps we can characterise Sen’s understanding of this “East vs Western
virtues” debate as such:
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Figure 2: Venn diagram of Virtues

A society valuing democracy does imply the presence of freedom-oriented
virtues. But the converse does not follow: the presence of freedom-oriented virtues does
not directly imply that said society values democracy. There are other characteristics of
Sen’s “democracy”, like an emphasis on the individual, that may not be something other
societies would decide as a “core virtue”.
Perhaps we should take a step back and revisit Sen’s definition of “freedom” and
its two roles. Recall that Sen frames the view of “freedom” as “both a primary end and
the principal means of development.”54 But we established earlier in Chapter 1 that for
our discussion, we characterised Nussbaum’s list of Central Human Capabilities as what
we mean when we are talking about Sen’s “freedoms as a primary end”. Chapter 2
explored why certain elements of Sen’s “freedom as a principal means” argument is more
nuanced than he makes it seem, in particular with regard to his prioritisation of
democratic political freedoms. Here, our investigation in this “cultural aspect” of his
arguments illuminate how perhaps he has defined the end-goals virtue too narrowly.

In earlier sections, we established that although Sen claimed to have successfully
proved his burden, the burden in the first place seems to be an insufficient basis to weigh
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his proof. But even if we suppose that Sen did show that Asians fundamentally value
freedom the way he does, it might be mistaken for him to think about freedom as a sole
virtue “ends.”
After all, Asian virtues are not entirely distinct or antithetical to “Western values”.
Many “Asian” virtues, such as respect for traditions, strong family ties, and emphasis on
the communal spirit, can also be found in other countries and so are not unique to a
particular geography. Rather than forcing a framing of all the 10 Universal Capabilities as
some manifestation of “freedom,” we can explore the possibility that they embody some
virtue than this umbrella blanket term of “freedom.” Additionally, we should not assume
that a society should absolutely prioritise a sole virtue as though virtues in society are
hierarchical like a pyramid (diagram on the left in figure 3 below). Instead, we can
characterise society’s values as being a ring or chain of interrelated values, all of which
contribute to Sen’s view of “development as freedom.”

Figure 3: Comparison of thinking about the positionality of virtues

The venn diagram (figure 2) depicts the different virtues people could value, and
as we can see, there may be intersections. That is not to say that one virtue in the Asian
set is entirely impossible to achieve in the Western set. It just means to say that is less
emphasised in the other set. Figure 3 here now provides an illustration of two plausible
ways that freedom might relate to other virtues a particular society would like to secure.
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The ring model (figure 3 on the right) depicts different positionality of virtues and
considers the role they each may have in enforcing the other virtues a society values.
However, unlike the pyramid model, these different virtues mutually reinforce each other,
but if one is removed, the entire structure does not collapse immediately.

CLOSING THE DEBATE ON THE CULTURAL CRITIQUE
At this point, you might be wondering: so what is my stance on this debate? On
one hand, I say that we cannot look to present-day social values in Asian societies for
evidence of a preference for democracy, because they are confounded by the influence of
Western colonialism; and yet I also make a case that we cannot look to pre-colonial
values because Sen’s portrayal of them is lacking or incomplete, and frankly, historical
examples can be outdated.
However, there are just too many confounding factors to assess whether “Asian
values” actually do or do not line up with Sen’s “freedom-oriented” framework. Clearly,
culture matters. But how it matters depends on the ebb and flow of historical events
within each country but also internationally. Fareed Zakaria aptly writes:
“A century ago, when East Asia seemed immutably poor, many scholars
(most famously German sociologist Max Weber) argued that Confucianbased cultures discouraged all the attributes necessary for success in
capitalism. A decade ago, when East Asia was booming, scholars turned
this explanation on its head, arguing that Confucianism actually
emphasized the essential traits for economic dynamism. Then the wheel
turned again, and many came to see in Asian values all the ingredients of
crony capitalism. Lee Kuan Yew was compelled to admit that Confucian
culture had bad traits as well, among them a tendency toward nepotism
and favoritism. But surely recent revelations about some of the United
States’ largest corporations have shown that U.S. culture has its own brand
of crony capitalism.”55
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So in the first place, all of Sen’s counterpoints are not very reliable metrics to
determine whether he is right about the “universality of democracy”, because the topic of
culture is such a complex field.
I am not trying to provide a rejoinder in favour of the cultural critique; I’m
offering a critique about the entire debate as it is currently being presented. Everything
discussed right now is difficult to conclusively determine, so it would bear little
significant result if we continued this line of discussion. The dynamic nature of cultural
development makes people prone to fall into a slippery slope of retrospectively linking
evidence for a society’s prosperity. Furthermore, whether a state or a society is conducive
for particular political systems may not have to do with values in the first place. To
reiterate the implications of Acemoglu et al.’s paper, we can reasonably suspect that
differences in culture is not as much of a determining factor as material conditions of a
region. The exploration of which is not within the scope of this paper.
Now that we’ve combed through the theoretical discussion, let us move onto an
empirical evaluation of a country that serves to substantiate the arguments we have made
thus far.
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Chapter 4: How well do these counterarguments fare empirically?
THE CASE OF SINGAPORE
After the end of WWII, Singapore returned to being a British colony, with
increasing levels of self-government being granted, culminating in Singapore's merger
with the Federation of Malaya to form Malaysia in 1963. However, social unrest and
disputes between Singapore's ruling People's Action Party and Malaysia's Alliance Party
resulted in Singapore's expulsion from Malaysia. Singapore became an independent
republic on 9 August 1965. Due to their colonial past, the country inherited the basic
democratic institutions of the British political traditions.56 And yet the introduction of
elections and representative institutions did not produce widespread sense of
“democracy”. The main political party dominating the arena at that time until today is the
People’s Action Party (PAP). Despite the criticism about Singapore being an
authoritarian state and the harsh draconian laws that citizens are subjected to, it is
undeniable that Singapore’s success story goes beyond the growth of their GDP.

Sen points to Singapore as an example of a society that he claims to be
antithetical to his ideal framework57: Singapore is among the countries who prioritised
economic growth at the expense of political liberty and civil rights. Singapore is an
empirical example of a country that, in Sen’s view, does not have an sufficient level of
political freedoms but seems to have achieved other substantive freedoms. So how come
Singapore is able to achieve this? I reason that it is because of a strong community spirit
and a de-emphasis on an individualistic mindset. The example of Singapore shows some
ways that the arguments in chapter 2 may be applied in practice. This is not to say that
Singapore is a perfect model of government, but perhaps we can learn from Singapore
that there plausibly exists an alternative of some informal (non-legal) mechanism that
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functions in place of the things that Sen deems exclusive to the constructive and
instrumental roles of political freedoms.

In this section, we will investigate whether Singapore has actually secured a
reasonable amount out of the 10 Central Human Capabilities checklist. Through this
investigation, we delve into the question of what is truly the point of government,
reassess whether the foundations of liberal democracy is truly superior to other
alternative forms of political ideology, and finally, assess whether Singapore proves itself
as a sufficiently valid empirical counterpoint to Sen’s framework.

THE PURPOSE OF GOVERNMENT
Recalling, as Sen laid out, that the purpose of a government is to lead a society
towards securing substantive freedoms, and thus achieve development. Although Sen
acquiesced that Singapore has “an admirable record in fostering intercommunity amity
and friendly coexistance,”58 he maintains that it is problematic that they severely lack
basic civil and political rights. While it is definitely true that Singapore is not beyond
reproach, it is worth exploring the rationale behind Singapore’s philosophy of governance
and consider their view of freedom.
Former politician aligned with the Singaporean People’s Action Party, Calvin
Cheng, wrote that “freedom is being able to walk on the streets unmolested in the wee
hours in the morning, to be able to leave one’s door open and not fear that one would be
burgled. Freedom is the woman who can ride buses and trains alone; freedom is not
having to avoid certain subway stations after night falls.”59 Contrasting their experience
with the West, the general sentiment among Singaporeans maintains that they are living
in a more civilised society whose individual freedoms are enhanced because of the so-
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called “draconian laws.” Singaporeans generally do not feel oppressed by their
government.
In a conversation with Fareed Zakaria, Lee Kuan Yew said that in the East, “the
main object [of a governmental system] is to have a well-ordered society so that
everybody can have maximum enjoyment of his freedoms.”60 Substantially, LKY’s claim
echoes those of Sen’s central thesis: the success of a society should be evaluated
primarily by these substantive freedoms.

In an attempt to better illuminate this discussion, we need to take a look at a
holistic picture of substantive freedoms Singapore enjoys. At the same time, we need to
understand the country’s justification for their different prioritisation of values, which
seems to not put political liberties at the forefront of “freedoms” valued.

1. Life: Being able to live a complete and satisfying life into old age. Not having life
cut short or being made such that it hardly seems worth living.
The life expectancy of Singaporeans is among the highest in the world at 81.4 and
85.7 for men and women respectively in 2019, according to the latest report released by
The Singapore Public Sector Outcomes Review.61 Relatedly, Singapore has a reputation
for being one of the safest cities in the world. Violent crime is rare – as of 2017, its
intentional homicide rate was just 0.7 per 100 thousand population62. One reason for this
could be the harsh penalties for offenders, as well as a strict ban on weapons for those not
in law enforcement. Singapore still carries out capital punishment for crimes such as
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murder and the illegal possession of firearms carry the death penalty63. The most
common type of crimes committed in Singapore are mostly commercial crimes, mostly
scams and fraud64. Although these cases have increased in the past year, the Singapore
Ministry of Home Affairs reasoned that this most likely due to the increased reliance on
internet activity because of the pandemic65. In general, cases of murder or violence
(resulting in the victim being severely injured) are rather low: In 2018, the homicide rate
for Singapore was 0.2 cases per 100,000 populations, which had fallen gradually from 1
case per 100,000 populations in 1999.

2. Bodily Health: Living with good health, and not in a state where ill health
seriously affects the quality of life. Having access to medical help as needed. To
have good food and be able to exercise in ways that sustain health.
According to the same The Singapore Public Sector Outcomes Review as above,
the health adjusted life expectancy at birth for Singaporeans is also one of the highest in
the world. Measuring the number of years a person is expected to live in good health, the
expectancy is 72.6 for men and 75.8 for women in 201766.
Singapore’s healthcare system frequently ranks among the best in the world,
coming in 6th back in 200067. More recently in 2019, the United Nations ranked them
number one out of 188 nations in the United Nations’ health goal rankings68. Singapore’s
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healthcare system has a unique approach: All workers are mandated to put a percentage
of their earnings into savings for the future. In 2012, workers up to age 50 had to put 20%
of their wages into these accounts, matched by another 16% of wages from their
employer.69 The funds from these accounts may be spent on healthcare, housing,
education, and insurance, with part of this being contributed by their employers 70. Dayto-day healthcare services are relatively affordable in Singapore. A routine check-up with
a General Practitioner plus (generic) medicine will likely cost you around S$20-S$30
while blood-work and x-ray will cost you around S$50-S$8071. Roughly 20% of primary
health care is provided through the government polyclinics, while the remaining 80% is
provided through some 2,000 private medical clinics72. Specialist consultation in a
private clinic costs between S$75 -S$12573.

3. Bodily Integrity: Being able to go where you want to go. Being free from attack
and abuse of any kind. Being able to satisfy healthy bodily needs.
There is affordable and accessible public housing, with 80% of resident
households living in Housing and Development Board flats, with 90% owning their own
homes. According to Mercer’s Quality of Living survey in 2016, Singapore has the
highest quality of living in Asia-Pacific, with the highest rank in personal safety74. A few
statistics to illustrate how Singaporean people are generally “free from attacks and abuse”
include:
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Issue

Number of cases per
100,000 population

Assault75

7.6

Robbery76

1.3

Rape77

2.9

Burglary78

3.5

Private car theft79

2

It should be recognised though that cases of attacks and abuse do exist and are
mostly found among domestic workers and their employers. Just earlier this year in
February 2021, a 41-year-old housewife starved, tortured and ultimately killed her
domestic worker from Myanmar80. Gaiyathiri Murugayan, the wife of a policeman,
pleaded guilty to 28 charges, the most serious being culpable homicide, for which
prosecutors had sought the maximum sentence of life imprisonment81. The Ministry of
Manpower launched a new initiative in April 2021 to “ensure employers are treating
them right,” by conducting random visits to meet maids and employers at their homes
and highlight safe working conditions as well as the channels through which maids can
get help if they need it82.

75

“Singapore Assault Rate, 2003-2020.” Knoema, knoema.com/atlas/Singapore/Assault-rate.
“Singapore Robbery Rate, 2003-2020.” Knoema, knoema.com/atlas/Singapore/Robbery-rate.
77
“Singapore Rape Rate, 2003-2020.” Knoema, knoema.com/atlas/Singapore/Rape-rate.
78
“Singapore Burglary Rate, 2003-2020.” Knoema, knoema.com/atlas/Singapore/Burglary-rate.
79
“Singapore Private car theft Rate, 2003-2020.” Knoema, knoema.com/atlas/Singapore/Private-car-theftrate.
80
Lum, Selina. “Cop's Wife Who Starved, Tortured Myanmar Maid to Death Makes Legal Moves to
Avoid Life Imprisonment.” The Straits Times, 29 Apr. 2021, www.straitstimes.com/singapore/courtscrime/cops-wife-who-starved-tortured-myanmar-maid-to-her-death-makes-legal-moves-to.
81
Ibid
82
Menon, Malavika. “MOM Starts House Visit Scheme to Ensure Welfare of Maids.” The Straits Times,
26 Apr. 2021, www.straitstimes.com/singapore/mom-starts-house-visit-scheme-to-ensure-welfare-ofmaids.
76

41

Related to safely “being able to go where you want to go,” Singapore’s
transportation infrastructure (like road paving quality, pedestrian walkways, illumination
and signage) is relatively well-planned and maintained83. As a result of the high cost of
owning a personal vehicle and the government’s significant emphasis on promoting
public transportation, Singapore offers a wide variety of publicly accessible forms of
transit (i.e. bus, rail, taxi, and increasingly, ride-share services)84. At least half of
Singapore’s population rides public transportation, with about 5.4 million trips made each
day85.

4. Senses, Imagination and Thought: Being able to use all of one's senses. Being free
to imagine, think and reason. Having the education that enables this to be done in
a civilized, human way. Having access to cultural experiences, literature, art and
so on and being able to produce one’s own expressive work. Having freedom of
expression, including political and religious.
In May 2015, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) led a study that rated Singapore as having the best education system in the
world.86 In general, classroom instruction in Singapore is highly-scripted and uniform
across all levels and subjects. Teaching is coherent, fit-for-purpose and pragmatic,
drawing on a range of pedagogical traditions, both Eastern and Western.87 However,
despite their extremely high performance in standardised examinations across majority
subjects, Singapore has also been criticised for rote learning techniques to deliver the
learning material—relying heavily on textbooks, lots of worksheets and practice problem
sets, etc… Since the late 1990s, Singaporeans have come to realise that “the pedagogical
model that had propelled [them] to the top of international leagues table is not
83
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appropriately designed to prepare young people for the complex demands of globalisation
and 21st knowledge economies.”88 Specifically, there has been a paradigm shift to foster
more creativity and the process of learning rather than the output (grades, awards, etc) .
Singapore is now shifting to a more relaxed style at the primary and secondary levels,
hoping to nurture people who can flexibly adapt themselves to a changing economy. The
Education Ministry announced it will scrap their “three-path system” by 2024.89 The
“three-path system” is a sorting system that determines which secondary schools students
would be able to attend depending on their Primary School Leaving Examinations
(PSLE) at the end of sixth grade. Instead, it will introduce a subject-based system where
students can choose the levels of each subject based on their strengths.90

Even though they are a small city-state with a young history, there is strong
evidence of widespread public interest in arts and culture. According to the 2020
Singapore Cultural Statistics released in January 2021, attendance at arts and cultural
events reached an all-time high of 15.6 million in 2019, surpassing 2018’s record of 13.6
million.91 Visitorship to national and private museums and heritage institutions reached
an all-time high of close to 9.6 million in 2019.92 Singapore is also very encouraging of
local artists in the fields of literature, visual arts (like painting, portraiture, photography,
sculptures), architecture and music.93

Regarding the ability to express religious and political views, the spaces
technically exist. But in reality, the government maintains a tight scrutiny over the
expression of views that oppose the government and Singaporean traditions. The
“Speakers’ Corner” was established in September 2000 at Hong Lim Park to provide a
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place for Singaporeans to express themselves in various ways, such as delivering public
speeches, holding peaceful demonstrations, exhibitions or performances.94 However, one
would have to apply to the National Parks Board and inform the government of when and
what they intend to utilise the space. Furthermore, one would have to apply for a Police
permit if the topic of the speech deals with matters that “may cause enmity or ill-will
between different racial or religious groups.”95

5. Emotion: Being able to become attached to other things and people outside of
ourselves, loving and caring for them. Experiencing grief, longing, gratitude and
justified anger. Not being subject to fear and anxiety or blighted by trauma or
neglect.
Singaporeans are known to have a sense of community spirit that emphasises a lot
on giving back to the community in the form of volunteering at nonprofits programming
or social enterprises. Social initiatives range across a spectrum of fields, from providing
aid to migrant workers, physical and cognitive therapy for the differently-abled, and stray
animal rescue shelters...96 Some examples of social enterprises in Singapore include: an
angel investor group who focuses on investing in low-income women-led social
enterprises, a delivery service that specifically caters health-conscious snacks to promote
healthier living, and an independent disaster relief agency who works to uplift and
empower communities through focus areas.97 Additionally, people are also very proactive
in sharing resources on how to find and involve oneself with these associations and
initiatives.98
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Among the key facets of Singapore’s development as a city-state in the 21st
century is their commitment to urban governance, specifically with regards to balancing
the needs of life, work and play.99 In general, Singapore is perceived to have a relatively
harmonious multicultural society. More recently, Singapore’s Minister for Culture,
Community and Youth, launched “Our SG Heritage Plan”, a masterplan for Singapore’s
heritage and museum sector with the intention of promoting “placemaking” through arts
and culture.100 Placemaking refers to the concept and process of inspiring people to
collectively reimagine and reinvent public spaces within their community.101 The goal is
to strengthen the connection between people and the places they share, and encourage a
collaborative process by which members of a particular community empathise and relate
to the physical, cultural, and social identities that define a place and its ongoing
evolution.102 Singapore’s goals for this place-making masterplan is to tap into their
“multicultural identity and rich history [...] to ensure that our tangible heritage continues
to resonate with our people, both as historical markers and as living everyday spaces.”103

Although it might be worth pointing out that some Singaporeans think the topic of
racial harmony and multicultural cohesion “feels sanitised.”104 because the various ethnic
groups in Singapore (namely the Chinese, Malay, Indian and Others) were never
“possessors” of their own ethnic discourse.105 User @patcheezie (pen name Bella) on
Medium wrote that Singapore’s claims of multiculturalism is “arguably a form of ‘fictive
ethnicity’” which is “the creation of a master narrative by the state that represents
different ethnic groups in the nation’s past, present and future, as if they are a natural and
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continuous community.”106 She argues that the PAP enshrined and institutionalised this
ideal to frame Singapore’s multiculturalism as an “organic, pre-mark of Singapore, even
though it was state initiated.”107 And yet even today, the PAP continues to perpetuate this
myth of multiculturalism through codified policies, structuring them along racial lines. 108

6. Practical Reason: Being able to consider and develop understanding of good and
evil, and to think critically about the world and one’s own place in it. Being able
to live with one’s conscience.
Ever since their pivot away from traditional rote-learning education, Singapore
has also channeled their strive for excellence in areas of interdisciplinary, global-minded
exploration and learning. One concrete example of a museum that exemplifies the
integration of critical and creative thinking about various topics is the Singapore
ArtScience Museum. The museum, opened back in February 2011, features major
exhibitions that blend art, science, culture and technology. What makes this museum
unique are the immersive exhibits and the interactive installations that present very
pertinent topics for people to engage with as they wander around the museum. The
“Future World: Where Art Meets Science” exhibition produced by teamLab “aims to
push the walls around our ideas of how one is supposed to experience art, while also reimagining the way we understand and engage with our natural environment.”109 The
installations for this exhibition utilises computer graphics and touch sensors displaying
virtual murals of blooming flowers and sounds that disappear when the viewer touches
the surrounding space on the wall. ArtScience museum also hosts workshops, speaker
events and limited campaigns in partnership with various social, academic and even
entertainment organisations. Some of their examples include the launch event for
Clean4Change, an initiative by Alliance to End Plastic Waste, aims to improve people's
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knowledge of recycling and encourage community clean-up efforts.110 ArtScience
museum integrated these partnerships into some of their exhibit installations, like the
“Museo Aero Solar” by Tomás Saraceno as part of their “Floating Utopias” exhibition.
The Museo Aero Solar is a solar sustainability themed gallery, meant to emulate a
“workspace” for visitors to make their own contribution to the piece. Visitors cut up used
plastic bags to add onto giant reels of used bags, which will then be put together into a
huge patchwork balloon that’ll be solar-powered and launched by the end of the
exhibition.111 As mentioned earlier, the museum also brings in exhibits and installations
that address a wide range of topics, including pop culture. ArtScience Museum will be
hosting the “Star Wars Identities: The Exhibition” during the first semester of 2021.

7. Affiliation: Being able to associate with others, living with them and acting for
them. Showing concern for people in general and interacting with others. Having
sympathy and compassion, acting to help people. Seeking justice and making
things right. Protecting others and the rights of people, including freedom of
speech and freedom from fear.
This first half of this point echoes that of point 5, but to add another very relevant
example of Singaporeans showing care and empathy towards members of their
community is their collective response to the COVID-19 pandemic. “[Singaporeans] have
seen residents placing hand sanitisers in lifts to share with neighbours, individuals
donating their S$600 Solidarity Payments to those who need it more, and groups coming
together to appreciate front-line workers and helping the vulnerable in society.”112
Grassroots organisations took a leading role in initiating social programs that spread
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kindness and support. An example is “Kampung Kakis”, a support system network
initiated by a young COVID-19 survivor who had a first-hand view of how elderly
patients suffered in isolation.113 The program matches needy residents with neighbours to
provide assistance and a support network.114 Another initiative involves recruiting
volunteer drivers to ferry healthcare professionals to and from their workplaces.115

Following up on point 4 above, even within the private lives of Singaporeans, the
government is willing to pursue legal action to stifle dissenting opinions. Singaporean
Leong Sze Hian was sued and lost a lawsuit filed by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong
(LHL) for merely sharing a news story on Facebook.116 The article in question was
published by Malaysian website The Coverage in November 2018, and falsely alleged
that Lee was involved in financial fraud and working in cahoots with former Malaysian
prime minister Najib Razak to launder funds in the multi-billion dollar 1Malaysia
Development Berhad (1MDB) scandal. PM LHL sued Leong for libel “in his capacity as
a private citizen” in order to “protect his reputation and integrity against the accusations
made.”117 It seems ridiculous that the court ruled against Leong, stating that he had
“‘published’ the article by merely sharing it”.118 Another example that is more actively
political in nature is the Jolovan Wham, a civil rights activist who has made a name for
himself in recent years drawing attention to the issue of freedom of speech (or rather, the
lack of it) in Singapore.119 Singapore’s government requires a police permit for any
assembly in a public place linked to a cause or a demonstration of a view, defending
these public assembly laws on grounds of upholding social order and safety. 120
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8. Other Species: Being able to live with the full range of creatures and plants that
inhabit the world around us. To be able to enjoy nature and appreciate its beauty.
With around 90 per cent of households in Singapore living within a 10-minute
walk from a park, Singapore is among one of the world’s greenest and most liveable
cities121. 70% of households are also within a 10-minute walk from a train station.122
Despite being located on the equator, Singapore’s lush greenery keeps the city relatively
cool. Most famously, there is Singapore’s Botanical Gardens, but there are at least 15
other parks, nature reserves and natural green spaces around the little island. The pockets
of natural landmarks around Singapore include: Coney Island, Tampines Eco Green, the
Kranji Marshes, Sungei Buloh Nature Park, and Bukit Timah Nature Reserve. Aside from
these nature spots, there is also a push to integrate natural elements inside buildings, such
as Changi airport’s natural attractions within the airport, the Changi Jewel mall, and
Gardens by the Bay at Marina Bay Sands. One might object and say that these are
artificial initiatives, but for Singapore’s geographical size, I say that it is commendable
how they continuously attempt to integrate the natural environment into different avenues
in the country.
9. Play: Being able to laugh, play games and generally have fun. Not having one’s
enjoyment and recreation criticized or prevented.
Singaporeans generally do not believe in “the talent myth” (which states that
some people are naturally more talented than others). This means that they do not see a
reason for a child to underperform and “tiger parents” tend to exact very strict, tough love
on their children to perform in school. This cycle is perpetuated into adulthood and here
we see the “ugly side” of Singapore’s highly competitive meritocratic culture: stress and
burnout is extremely common among youths and adults alike. Of course, this is not to say
that Singaporeans are not happy in general, but oftentimes the work-life balance tips on
the side of “work”. But according to a Cigna 360 Well-Being Survey done in 2019, 92%
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of working Singaporeans are stressed, which is 8% higher than the global average.123
Another study conducted by healthcare consultancy firm Asia Care Group has found that
“Singapore spends about US$2.3 billion (S$3.1 billion), or 18%, of its total healthcare
expenditure on stress-related illnesses annually.”124 In 2017, the OECD conducted their
triennial test (called the Programme for International Student Assessment, or PISA for
short) that tried to study the connection between wellbeing and achievement. The 5,825
Singaporean students who were revealed that most were anxious about tests and
grades.125 Survey results indicated that their anxiety levels were significantly higher than
the OECD average for most questions on the survey: 66% of students across all OECD
countries said they were worried about poor grades at school, but among Singapore
students, it was 86%.126 National Institute of Education don Jason Tan said the finding on
high anxiety levels is “not out of step with a school system that uses exams to channel
students into different secondary and post-secondary pathways.”127 However, it is worth
noting that the Ministry of Education has introduced changes in the national education
system to reduce stress and anxiety among students, most notably being the revised PSLE
scoring and secondary-school cut-off system128 (although to mixed responses from the
public)129.
Exploring a different facet of “play” and enjoyment in Singapore, let us consider
the infamous example of Singapore’s chewing gum ban, which was instituted as early as
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1992. This ban “remains one of the best-known aspects of life in Singapore.”130 Other
punishable everyday actions include littering, graffiti, jaywalking, spitting, expelling
“mucus from the nose” and urinating anywhere but in a toilet.131 If it is a public toilet,
you are legally required to flush it.132 On the practical level, this is part of the broader
effort to uphold high standards of public hygiene and cleanliness. Former PM Lee’s
rationale was that chewing gum is a trivial price to pay for clean, comfortable living in
public areas. To clarify, the ban was placed on the sale and importation of chewing gum,
not necessarily the possession and consumption of it.133 Outsiders may say that this is
ridiculous. But the effect of the original ban was immediate—within a few months,
chewing gum more or less disappeared from Singapore and public areas experienced
tremendous improvements: flattened clots vanished from pavements, train doors went
about their business unimpeded since the sensors on their doors were not covered by
gum.134 An associate professor of law at Singapore Management University, Eugene Tan,
said that “[Singaporeans] joke about these policies... we describe Singapore as a ‘fine
city’—a tongue-in-cheek reference to the many fines that can be imposed for various
types of social misconduct.”135 But personally, he does not miss chewing gum, saying
that “the footpaths look a lot nicer without the ugly gum marks.”136 A Singaporean
student studying in London, Pei-yi Yu, also sees advantages in going gum-free,
recounting that he “has often had the unpleasant experience of getting my body parts into
contact with both fresh and stale chewing gum in lecture theatres and classrooms across
the UK.”137
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The concept here is not just about the chewing gum itself, on a more cultural
level, Lee aimed to cultivate a sense of “good public behaviour” in his aim to build the
“perfect Singapore.”138 Some other aspects of entertainment and private enjoyment that
are banned include recreational fireworks (during non-festival occasions) on the basis of
minimising public hazard.139
10. Control Over One’s Environment: (A) Political: Being able to participate
effectively in political choices that govern one’s life; having the right of political
participation, protections of free speech and association. (B) Material: Being able
to hold property (both land and movable goods), and having property rights on an
equal basis with others; having the right to seek employment on an equal basis
with others; having the freedom from unwarranted search and seizure. In work,
being able to work as a human being, exercising practical reason, and entering
into meaningful relationships of mutual recognition with other workers.
(B) To expound a little more on point 3 about house-ownership, there is a
distinction between house ownership and land ownership. Due to Singapore’s historical
land acquisition act back in 1967140, all land ultimately belongs to the state, so there are
restrictions to the terms and conditions of “owning land” or rather, leasing it for 99
years141.

Regarding equity in property rights and employment opportunities, Singapore
does not have a framework of dedicated anti-discrimination legislation142. However, they
do have the “Tripartite Guidelines on Fair Employment Practices” which applies to
employment practices such as recruitment and hiring, performance management, and
138
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dismissals. Although there is a strong culture of meritocracy in Singapore, there does
exist some racist undertones in society (as you may have gathered from the above points).
Although the Ministry of Manpower has introduced and emphasised anti-discriminatory
policies, most recently in the form of a licensing condition to make clear the obligations
of agencies to uphold fair employment practices143, despite so, it is unclear how these
practices are actually implemented in the workplace.

(A) From the examples interspersed throughout the paper, it seems clear enough
that Singaporeans only have formal democratic political freedoms in writing, and not so
much in practice. This is, after all, the main point of contention we are examining.

Now that we have a better picture of Singaporean society, let us move into an
analysis of their emphasis on the community as opposed to the individual.

ADOPTING A COMMUNITARIAN EMPHASIS
Earlier we made the case of why Sen’s “individualist” assumption was faulty on
the basis of the process of identity-formation necessitating communal associations.
Further we also explained how Anderson’s argument frames Marx’s debunking of the
construct “individuality” in the context of rebutting Sen’s liberalist perspective. Let us
investigate how Anderson’s communal view of identity formation plays out empirically
in a society like Singapore.

On the account of being part of a society, we cannot think of ourselves as
“egoistic” individuals in society. Thus, we are not as “free” as we’d like to think of
ourselves. In liberalism, the individual stands at the centre of liberalism. Individuals
should be able to freely associate with others as well as be the rational judge of their own
interests and welfare. However, being part of a political society mandates interaction
143
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amongst the individuals who are part of it. Yet formulations about liberal democracy tend
to not include the discussion of the nature of these very social elements. At both
individual and group levels, the state is supposedly a neutral body to maintain the rules of
social transactions144. If we continue to conceive of social relations as a secondary factor
in the discussion of political societies, it would be challenging to develop concepts of
“collective interest” and “collective responsibility” in the social and political spheres.

Isaiah Berlin, in his essay Two Concepts of Liberty, characterised the fundamental
human nature as one being a social creature. Berlin writes that “[I] am a social being in a
deeper sense than that of interaction with others. [...] perhaps all of my ideas about
myself, in particular my sense of my own moral and social identity, are intelligible only
in terms of the social network in which I am an element.”145 The individual is never just
the individual. Communal links of identity are much more intricate and much more
instrumental in cultivating each person’s personhood. “My individual self is not
something which I can detach from my relationship with others.” The communal view of
identity formation we explored in chapter 2 provides the framework that justifies this
reasoning.

A discussion on fundamental natural rights, duties and goals of development
would be incomplete without including the social, relational aspect of the matter. It is not
enough to think about our natural duties towards others as detached persons, nor would it
be possible to grasp a holistic view of the Central Human Capabilities developmental
goals without recognising these intricate relationships. There is a layer of duties and
obligations that we have towards particular groups of people—given, to varying
degrees—in virtue of being related to them in some way. Some of these “duties” (or
144
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value-ends, if you’d like to call them) are more fundamental than civic and moral
considerations of natural and voluntary duties. Recognising that being part of a social unit
cultivates an understanding that you are an agent extending from this unit, rather than
your agency being extended to obligations in that unit. The directionality should be
understood as group ties being fundamentally part of the individual rather than individual
absorbing these ties to the group into their identity. Internalising values and interests of
different communities as part of the “self” develops an understanding of certain duties
and expectations to uphold. As such, there would inevitably be some further restrictions
on the individual’s liberty that they must internalize in accordance with the society they
are part of.

But hold on, how does this argument differ from the social contract? You give up
some of your freedoms as being part of a society, to allow the government to govern over
you and the rest of society. True, but the social contract is still based on an individualistic
view of persons in a contract with each other. Here we are explaining the ties that exist
among the constituents of society themselves on a more basic level, even prior to a
discussion of fundamental rights qua persons. This proposal is asking to reconsider the
conception of an individual’s relationship with the other members of that society.

Central to communitarianism is the idea that collective interests are placed above
individual ones. Sure, perhaps this way of thinking is more subconscious and less explicit
in some societies more than others. Logically, what constitutes the “collective interest”
should be based on some form of “consensus.” But how would such aggregation be
achieved if the society, like Singapore, lacked a certain threshold of Sen’s political
freedoms? Perhaps an understanding of what these common interests are could stem from
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some socially entrenched national identity or values. Singapore’s national ideology was
articulated in a list of “five shared values” that the PAP proclaimed in 1991146:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Nation before community and society above self;
Family as the basic unit of society;
Community support and respect for the individual;
Consensus not conflict;
Racial and religious harmony
While I recognise there are some problematic implications of each of these values

listed, the list in itself is sufficient to indicate the undercurrents of the Singaporean
attitude toward social relations. In the US where individualism takes front-and-center
stage, almost like herding cats. Singapore, on the other hand, is more like an ant colony:
each member understands the general principles guiding their community and are thus
able to move more cohesively, and the ability to maintain order in society. This
prioritization of communal values also lends insight into the “trustee” form of governance
that Singaporeans have come around to accept.
THE “TRUSTEE” MODEL OF GOOD GOVERNANCE
For this section, whenever I refer to “Singapore”, I am referring to the cabinet of
government specifically the one headed by Founding Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew and
his successor. I am not claiming that these views are entirely accepted by every citizen of
Singaporean society.

Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, successor to PM LKY who served from 1990 to
2004, explained how in Singapore, the government acts more like a “trustee” of the
country: “as a custodian of the people’s welfare, it exercises independent judgement on
what is in the long-term interests of the people and acts on that basis.”147 Singapore’s
146
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understanding of “good governance,” he articulated, is built on three main pillars:
democratic accountability, long-term orientation and social justice.148
Lee’s Singapore does not disagree with Sen’s vision that “development” is the
desired end goal of society149. In fact, their understanding of a good government echoes
those of Sen’s view, stating that a government must perform well along three dimensions:

1. Political dimension: establishing objectives and the just exercise of leadership
based on high standards of integrity. The existence of a clearly formulated and
transparent process for establishing the legitimacy of government.
2. Institutional dimension: pertains to the “managerial capacity” of the government.
Specifically referring to the role played by responsive and competent public
authorities in establishing the economic environment through growth-promoting
policies and determining the distribution of assets and benefits among society.
This also includes the establishment of systems or organisations of problem
solving and conflict resolution, which requires sustainable institutional channels
and an effective framework for [relevant groups] to pursue viable solution
options.
3. Functional dimension: pertains to the linkage between elements of good
governance and “economic growth,” which really refers to other substantive
goods in society. This includes clear laws that are predictably enforced in order to
ensure the safety and security of our citizens, as well as the provision of social
and infrastructure services both for socio-economic development and for
industrial capacity.150
Although different in categorisation and terminology, these three dimensions
somewhat resemble Sen’s concept of instrumental freedoms. So what is Singapore’s
rationale for adopting this “guardian state” (trusteeship) philosophy and what is their
justification that it sufficiently functions the roles that democratic political freedom
supposedly secures?
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The sense of “trusteeship” is further reinforced and justified on the principle that a
guardian state best ensures the political stability necessary for development and
modernization.151 The PAP set forth a set of six principles of leadership to “develop the
type of functional political society and system which would allow good leaders to
emerge, function and implement sound policy.”152 The six principles are:

1. The need to institute an exemplary and competent government supported by an
effective civil service
2. The need for unity in the core group of leaders
3. The need to enhance the leadership cohort through the nurturing of talent
4. The integrity of leadership must be unquestionable with complete accountability,
transparency, openness and separateness between personal assets and public
funds.
5. The need for leadership self-renewal, which is not enough to ensure the adequate
replacement of old leaders but also to introduce new generations of leaders who
are in touch with the issues facing a new generation of voters.
6. The need to go for results and not political correctness153
These principles, taken together, boil down to two main development goals for the
Singaporean people: education and civil society. Education in Singapore not only
emphasises skill acquisition for gainful future employment, but also a cultural and moral
development of the self.154 Leaders need to identify with the needs and aspirations of the
population, Lee said. Under the trusteeship model, since the ministers are guardians of
the state, they are expected to make decisions that are intended to advance the public’s
interest155.

In theory, the promotion of government accountability and transparency is well
and good. But the looming question is how to ensure that this “trusteeship model” would
not degenerate into authoritarianism? Since elections and free speech seem to only be
151
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“freedoms” de jure (it’s not really an open competitive election if there are no other
viable alternative candidates because the government seems to stifle political discourse
and prevent opposition political parties from developing and challenging them), can
Singapore really claim that they have a functioning accountability mechanism?

Singapore believes that beyond legal political mechanisms, their layer of
accountability measures lie in the socially-entrenched norms that come with this
trusteeship model. There is a strong emphasis on the belief that “the government must
govern and the leaders must lead from the front with a premium placed on personal
ability and integrity.”156 This communitarian-based value system engenders a high regard
of trust and expectations of the government by the people.157
Singapore’s story sheds light on how an informal social accountability system
plays out in place of a formal legal procedure. Although empirical evidence (as we
explored in the checklist of Singapore’s Central Human Capabilities) raises questions on
these justifications, this trusteeship model remains a compelling model to consider as an
alternative avenue to democratic political freedoms.

ADDRESSING CRITICISMS AGAINST SINGAPORE
As I have pointed out previously, Singapore is not by any means a perfect model
of governance. The principles the PAP touts in theory may not actually be executed as
promised, and there still remains overlooked loopholes in the system they promote.

Critics of Singapore see it as the sacrifice of civil liberties or the encroachment of
several basic human rights. Singapore’s 2017 presidential elections evinces these claims.
Former Speaker of Parliament Halimah Yacob has emerged victorious by default since

156
157

Sebastian, pg 282
Ibid

59

she was the only candidate running.158 Singaporeans were upset that “ meritocracy and
electoral fairness have been eroded to fulfill perceived political goals.”159 This happened
because Singapore’s election department had decreed the presidency would be reserved
for candidates from the Malay community this time. Halimah’s experience as house
speaker automatically qualified her under the nomination rules. Of the four other
applicants, two were not Malays and two were not given certificates of eligibility,160 thus
preventing them from running in the election.
PM Lee Hsien Loong said this was an opportunity for the government to “answer
to social cohesion lay in creating a culture of meritocracy, rather than adopting policies
of positive discrimination to boost the chances of advancement for Singapore’s Malay
and Indian minorities.”161 A government report published in 2013 found Malays felt they
were sometimes discriminated against and had limited prospects in some institutions,
such as the armed forces. Although having a Malay president by itself is unlikely to
resolve concerns over under-representation of minority groups in Singapore, analysts and
advocates say it could help foster trust among communities.162 This attempt at managing
ethnic conflict exemplifies a moment where Singaporean leaders restricted civil liberties
in favour of promoting social cohesion and harmony. Sen may disagree with the
Singaporean government’s actions, but it seemed that most Singaporeans seemed to
resolve their disappointment rather quickly. Ultimately, this event did not really detract
from their standard level of freedoms in the other aspects—the office of president is
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largely a ceremonial role in Singapore (although they still had power to veto some of the
government’s decisions, like fiscal matters relating to the country’s reserves).

Additionally, even though Singapore does still have elections, there has not been a
strong rivaling political party able to overtake the PAP’s popularity. Can we really say
that Singaporeans have a substantive freedom to determine who governs them, if there
are no other viable parties/candidates? We’ve talked extensively about this particular
facet of political freedoms being lacking in the country, but let us consider the alternative
avenues available for Singaporeans to voice change, if not through direct political
participation in the traditional notion of political freedoms? How exactly does the
Singaporen government stay in tune with the evolving public interest if they suppress
political participation? It is true that during the first two decades since independence, the
Singapore government’s engagement with its citizens largely consisted of disseminating
information on development and policies.163 In this initial phase, leadership from the
government was strong, decisions about how to develop the nation were made and
implemented swiftly, and social change was primarily driven through a top-down
approach.164 In order to achieve national agendas, the government needed to initiate mass
social campaigns seeking cooperation from the people. As the country began to develop,
the early 1990s saw the development of a “collective consciousness” amongst
Singaporeans regarding social issues and the developmental trajectory of the nation.165
Moreover, as the 21st century saw an increased interest in liberal ideas and “a global
trend of consultative governance”, the Singaporean public desired to play a more active
role in the development of their nation.166

163

Nguyen, Hoa, and Julienne Chen. “Towards More Participatory Governance in Singapore.” Lee Kuan
Yew Centre for Innovative Cities, lkycic.sutd.edu.sg/blog/towards-participative-governance-singapore/.
164
Teo, S E. “Planning Principles in Pre- and Post-Independence Singapore.” The Town Planning Review,
vol. 62, 1992, pp. 163–185.
165
Nguyen, “Towards More Participatory Governance in Singapore.”
166
Paul, K., & Tan, A. S. S.“Democracy and the grassroots sector in Singapore”. Space and Polity, vol
7(1), 2003, pp.3-20

61

The Singaporean government thus instituted avenues for groups and individuals to
share their ideas and input on policies, social issues and the current state of development
in the country. These initiatives include: REACH Singapore (a consultation platform that
collects input from Singaporeans on policy and programmatic issues raised by
governmental agencies, as well as enables civil servants to publicly respond to feedback);
eCitizen Ideas! (an idea-generation platform for residents to contribute to questions and
challenges posed by government agencies); Our Singapore Conversation (an engagement
exercise in August 2012 that hosted various focus group discussions through a
collaboration among different government agencies regarding topics that cut across all
population segments).167 But despite these various initiatives, there is often no clear
understanding of how such voices will be given weight or factored into decision-making
processes.168 It still remains to be seen how the public input will be effectively
incorporated into government planning and policymaking.

Another example that relates more on the individual level: in Singapore, there is a
law that empowers the police to test a person’s urine for drugs if he or she behaves in a
suspicious manner. A positive result would subject them to rehabilitative treatment.169
The West might see this as a paternalistic and unjustifiable violation of the right to
privacy. But for Asians this may be considered the restriction imposed by this law as a
legitimate trade-off for the value of individual health and public safety. One could say
that the West has a more reactive approach to upholding rights—you have the right to do
whatever you want until proven that you are a significant danger to yourself, or a danger
to others, then that right will be taken away. But the East takes a more proactive attitude
towards rights—your rights may be restricted on the grounds of preventing the possibility
of harm to others when the state determines that it’s warranted.
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A critical point of contention is the placement of the “family unit as the basic unit
of society”. Such a perspective limits the power and autonomy of women. Families as an
institution can be very oppressive and problematic since it has a traditional hierarchy that
puts other members of the family in subordination to the breadwinner in the family.
Typically, the breadwinners are the husbands and thus women are financially dependent
on men. If this characteristic is part of what is supposed to be an alternative mechanism
to achieve ordering of substantive freedoms in society, what kind of “consensus” are
being made in society in the first place?

But another aspect for Sen to reconsider is that, perhaps there are cases when
having a lack of democratic political freedoms can actually better secure other
substantive freedoms in society. A very recent example is how different governments
were able to manage the COVID-19 pandemic in their respective countries. Governments
that were able to issue “authoritarian lockdowns” were better able to issue public health
mandates that were more effective (ex: Singapore, China, Australia, Taiwan).
In closing, Singapore’s “trustee government model” is an alternative way to
securing capabilities and achieving the instrumental and constructive role that Sen
assigns to democratic political freedoms. It is obviously not a perfect model, as seen from
the criticisms above, especially with regards to the very traditional sense of gender roles
and hierarchies it subscribes to. But nevertheless, this model, done well, might just secure
the very things Sen proposes. In fact, there might be something to be said about how the
trustee model incorporates non-formal accountability mechanisms in building a cohesive
society, that just might be stronger, and more effective than formal laws.
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Future Work
One of the biggest criticisms against using Singapore as a counterexample of a
successful Asian country is its country size. Any dot on a map of any average scale is
larger than the entirety of Singapore. One could literally walk from traverse the country
by foot, within 12-13 hours across the island (around 50 km)170. Managing such a small
country will undeniably be much easier than managing any other country in discussion
(be it the USA, the UK, any country in the European continent or other East/Southeast
Asian countries). Moreover, Singapore is such a young, small and multiracial country. It
is difficult to trace their history of national culture and formulate a coherent intellectual
tradition.171

Further lines of inquiry on this topic of development and governance would need
to include exploring other case studies such as: a comparison of the development of an
Asian country that is considered a democracy (like Japan) vs the development of a
“Western democracy”; we would also have to delve into Singapore’s ideological
trajectory from its soft authoritarianism history to communitarianism as well as the
process of their cultural construction and national identity. A more arduous challenge
might be a case study investigation of societies that are labelled as democracies or that
have secured political freedoms but may still “fail” to secure other substantive freedoms.
Of course, there are a number of confounding variables that contribute to why different
countries prosper more holistically than others. Maybe we might do well to look beyond
existing bodies of literature in the field of political philosophy (that has repeatedly talked
about institutions, culture and values) and study alternative factors like geography and
material resources, as touched upon by Acemoglu et al.

On a more interdisciplinary front, social science research might benefit from
considering the Central Human Capabilities as a more holistic framing of the “quality of
170
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life” measures in countries. Currently I find that surveys and research surrounding these
topics are either very narrow and vague (like a “happiness index”172) or very broad and
vague (like the ones presented by organisations like the United Nations).
Singapore’s “trustee” form of “democracy” may well just be a model that only
suits Singapore—their unique development from the conditions of post-colonial soft
authoritarianism legacies, the combined influences of traditions and cultures, and the
particular ordering of values the nation chose are all specific to Singapore. The “litmus
test” of all governments everywhere should not be adherence to a particular political
theory or ideal, but whether they can govern effectively, fairly, and in a way that
increases the general welfare of their society. Singapore is indeed a non-liberal, nondemocratic example that secures Sen’s substantive freedoms. Despite her critics, the
Singaporean model is justifiable on the communitarian values upon which their society
fundamentally rests upon.
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Conclusion
The exercise of philosophical inquiry is meant to deepen our thinking on existing
literature and encourage the birth of multiple potential solutions to issues in society.
Sometimes, to do so requires us to uproot certain long-standing assumptions to make way
for novel considerations. In his book, Sen concluded by saying that “development is
indeed a momentous engagement with freedom’s possibilities.”173 Perhaps the
possibilities include reorganising how we think about the relationship between the
different ingredients of development.

This paper sought to contribute to the discussion of government systems and
development by challenging existing individualistic assumptions about the role of
political freedoms. I first laid out a view of development as authored by Amartya Sen.
Under his conceptualisation of “democracy as freedom,” he explained why freedom is
not only the primary ends of development, but also the principal means of achieving
development. We characterised the goals of development (Sen’s substantive freedoms) as
Martha Nussbaum’s 10 Central Human Capabilities. In order to achieve these
capabilities, Sen introduced a list of five instrumental freedoms, among which he places
special emphasis on political freedoms, which he claims as preeminent and absolutely
foundational to securing all the other substantive freedoms. I took issue with this
particular facet of his framework and then proceeded to explore rebuttals to the
constructive and instrumental roles of democratic political freedoms.
I then argued that Sen’s conception of political freedoms has an “individualist
assumption” that treats individuality as prior to any other communal relationship with
other beings. Using Anderson’s work on identity formation, I show how the individual
identity is more complex and requires communal interaction prior to the development of
a sense of self. Complementing her work is that of the narrative conception of identity
and Marx’s suspicion that the notion of the “individual” is an ideological construct that
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prevents one from fully achieving liberation. This de-emphasis of the individual renders
Sen’s claims of necessity for the political freedoms less convincing than he claims.
After that, we addressed Sen’s claim that democratic political freedom is actually
intrinsically a universal value, which took us through a deliberation over the relationship
between cultural values and democracy. Having explored Sen’s counterclaims to the
cultural critique, we find that his defense is lacking a comprehensive view of the factors
involved in tracing the development of culture and values. After investigating colonial
legacies and its continuing effects on different countries (including differences in
geopolitical powers and material resources) as well as the trans-temporal evolution of
cultures, it seems that the cultural debate is rather inconclusive and may not be a
productive conversation to analyse further. However, this discussion about “culture” does
link to the above arguments regarding a communal view of identity formation. Rather
than distinguishing countries based on geographical east vs west cultural stereotypes, it is
worth thinking about this sense of community spirit in different societies as giving reason
to allow for alternative models of political governance and government accountability.

As such, we turn to Singapore, a case study of a country that does not have
political freedoms but appears to have a high threshold of most other substantive freedom
capabilities. We charted out empirical evidence of the country’s fulfillment of
Nussbaum’s checklist to validate the above statement. Then we examined Singapore’s
philosophical justification behind their trustee model of governance. Their ethos of
leadership accountability and transparency is rooted in socially-entrenched values rather
than on formal, legal infrastructure. Although imperfect, there are useful aspects of
Singapore’s development experience that serve as a viable alternative model to Sen’s
model.

Development should be seen as a neutral term that does not prescribe a specific
step-by-step guideline of one specific form of model. As we have seen throughout the
discussion, the viability of transposing a model of governance depends on the differences
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in geography, historical and cultural progression, as well as a country’s contextual
positionality in the world. Ultimately, the challenge of achieving “development” is not
only for each country to wrestle with separately. Societies and political systems thus need
to respond accordingly to address growing challenges arising from this very dynamic
international landscape we are all a part of. And different countries, faced with their own
unique mix of characteristics, may very well require different institutional arrangements
to achieve their state of “development”.
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